Since self-control problems were first analyzed by Strotz (1956) , researchers have frequently emphasized that dynamically inconsistent preferences, such as present-biased preferences, engender a demand for commitment. 1 Here, and throughout this paper, I define commitment as a "pure" restriction on one's choiceset with no confounding extrinsic benefits such as tax deferral in a savings plan or intra-household strategic advantages. 2 Commitment is a problematic prediction, since we see so little of it in the economy. Researchers have been able to induce some experimental participants to commit themselves (e.g., Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006) , but across 1 This issue plays a central role in Phelps and Pollak (1968) , Laibson (1997), and Rabin (1999) . For related analyses see Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) , Fudenberg and Levine (2006) , and Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006) . For a review of the literature on commitment see Bryan, Karlan, and Nelson (2010) .
2 E.g., Ashraf (2009) .
3 For example, see Giné et al. (2010) and Kaur et al. (forthcoming) .
One study that finds widespread commitment is Beshears et al. (2015) . Time is discrete, t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}. An agent has a present-biased discount function, with present bias parameter and 0 < < 1. The agent has a long-run discount factor 1.
A non-divisible task needs to be done and the agent decides when to do the task. Doing the task requires a single period of effort; if effort is expended during period t, the agent pays an effort cost for that period, . The effort cost for period t, , is realized at the start of period t (so its realized value is not known before period t but is known in period t before the agent decides whether or not to do the task 
II. Demand for Commitment in the Case of
Sophistication I now turn to an analysis of (self) commitment, which is related to the planner's problem in Carroll et al. (2009) . In this section I consider the problem faced by an agent at time "zero," who is deciding whether or not to commit her future selves to binding deadlines. Here I assume that period one is the earliest period that the project can be done, so period zero is a pre-period where the only decision is whether or not to choose deadlines for future selves.
6 See the NBER working paper version of Carroll et al. (2009). In this section, I consider the case of (perfect) sophistication and a vanishingly small direct price, , of implementing a commitment contract (i. e., ↓ 0). An agent will commit to a deadline when the payoff from commitment exceeds the payoff from allowing future selves to have the flexibility to decide when to do the task. For this problem, the personal optimum is either to commit (during period 0) to do the task in period 1, or to allow all future selves to decide for themselves. 6 I show that commitment will be chosen when
√3 .
The first inequality is the threshold at which self zero would like to commit all future selves to act immediately. The second inequality is the threshold at which such commitment becomes redundant because at this threshold the agent will always act immediately for all values of in the support of F. In other words, the second inequality is the threshold at which * ̅ , so even a vanishingly small direct price of commitment will eliminate commitment. which is labelled "Commitment." Figure 1 also plots the region in which the agent completes the task immediately even if there has not been a commitment (the northwest region labelled "Immediate Action"). Finally, Figure 1 plots the region in which the agent prefers to give her future selves the freedom to decide when to do the task (the southeast region labelled "Procrastination").
A few properties are apparent in Figure 1 . The calibration of E[ ] is based on the joint assumption that the task will take one hour and that the mean opportunity cost of time is a typical hourly wage. Figure 1 also plots the point √3 20, 5 . This is the case in which 7 For example, see Angeletos et al. (2001) and Laibson et al. (2007) .
8 This is calibrated for a typical household procrastinating on joining a 401(k) plan with a 6% match threshold and a 50% match. For the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of an hour of time is = $20/√3 $11.55.
Setting L = 5 implies that the household losses $5 per period for as long as the project remains uncompleted. If periods are days, this amounts to $1,825 of costs resulting from a year of procrastination on this task. 8
As you can see, at the point √3 20, 5 the agent prefers to procrastinate rather than to commit. But this is only an illustrative example. It is possible to generate reasonable calibrated examples with commitment as the preferred choice -i.e., calibrated points that lie in the shaded "Commitment" region. We can study this weakening quantitatively, using the equations that we have already derived. Specifically, replace by (the agent's naive expectation of her future present bias parameter). Now the band of commitment narrows -see Figure 2 for the case = 0.85 > 0.7. simplicity, the loss is interpreted to be the lost match, or $5 per day for a household earning If were raised to one, the two thresholds in Figure 2 would converge to the 45 degree line and the commitment region would vanish.
III. Demand for Commitment in the
I don't believe that many economic actors have complete naiveté ( 1 , so I am prone to believe that naiveté is partial (as plotted in Figure 2 ) and therefore provides only a partial explanation for the lack of equilibrium commitment.
IV. Demand for Commitment When Commitment has a (Non-Zero) Price
Now I study the case in which a commitment contract has a non-trivial implementation price: 0. This price includes all hassle costse.g., taking the time to set up a contract and the system of enforcement -as well as direct payments made to obtain the commitment contract. For the calibrated model, the introduction of turns out to swamp the demand for commitment. Figure 3 Why does the commitment region dramatically shrink at even a modest price, , for the commitment contract? Commitments are not generating substantial perceived welfare gains.
Sophisticates don't gain much from commitment because their welfare losses from procrastination aren't very large. Naifs don't perceive that they gain much from commitment, because they don't realize how much their procrastination is (probabilistically) going to hurt them.
Finally, everyone -both sophisticates and naifs -recognize the costs that come with commitment, including the loss of flexibility and the direct price of the commitment contract itself.
These costs often swamp the perceived benefits from commitment.
V. Conclusion
These calculations provide a quantitative analysis of the perceived benefits of commitment in a particular task completion problem.
In this environment, the perceived net benefits from informationally feasible 9 commitments are modest, implying a weak motive for commitment. In the case that I study, a small price of commitment can tip the scales against commitment. Commitments solve one problemin this example, procrastination -but produce other problems -time allocations that are insensitive to the opportunity cost of time. Note: The Immediate Action, Commitment, and Procrastination regions for a partially naive present-biased agent with = 0.85 > 0.7 (and no direct cost for creating/implementing a commitment contract). The horizontal axis is the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time (scaled by √3). The vertical axis is the loss per period from delaying action.
FIGURE 3. COMMITMENT REGION FOR A SOPHISTICATED AGENT WITH A DIRECT COST OF COMMITMENT
Note: The Immediate Action, Commitment, and Procrastination regions for a sophisticated present-biased agent with 0.7 and a $5 direct cost for creating/implementing a commitment contract. The horizontal axis is the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time (scaled by √3 ). The vertical axis is the loss per period from delaying action.
FIGURE 1. COMMITMENT REGION FOR A SOPHISTICATED AGENT
Note: The Immediate Action, Commitment, and Procrastination regions for a sophisticated present-biased agent with 0.7 (and no direct cost for creating/implementing a commitment contract). The horizontal axis is the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time (scaled by √3 ). The vertical axis is the loss per period from delaying action.
